Abstract
In this contribution I analyze the relation between understanding a joke and laughing about it. To be more explicit, I seek to investigate whether one of them comes first, and if so, which, or whether they come jointly. I elaborate my position by defending the claim that performed jokes, in successful cases, elicit a response in which laughter and understanding occur simultaneously. To develop this theory, I determine the conditions that must be met in order to allow for a joke performance to be successful. This ideal situation of ‘successful joking’ is given if and only if the recipient both understands the joke and laughs about it. By putting laughter and understanding on an equal footing in my model, I support the idea that the pleasure we experience in joke reception is based both on insight and entertainment. By establishing my model of simultaneity (L/U), I challenge two other positions. The first one suggests that laughter, as a triumphant expression of successful ‘data integrity checking’ in the reception of a joke, is based on and follows understanding (U-L). The other position regards laughter as the primary phenomenon of the joke and insights only as potential side-effects (L-[U]).
Keywords: joke, laughter, performance, performative conditions, reception, understanding
Abstract
In this paper I draw attention to the grammatical “deep joke”. Wittgenstein refers to this type of joke in PI §111, comparing its depth to the depth of philosophy. I start with a brief review of Wittgenstein’s notions of “grammar” and “depth”. Building on these ideas, I first offer some general considerations regarding jokes and then present descriptive remarks about deep jokes. I evaluate possible examples of deep jokes, including primary examples provided by Wittgenstein, which appear in preliminary versions (1936-46) of the Philosophical Investigations but were cut later. I attempt to capture the distinctive qualities of deep jokes and seek to elucidate their philosophical potential. The results of the investigation of deep jokes provide an original reflection on our (mis-)understanding of linguistic practices.
Editors’ Preface “Book Symposium on Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing (OUP 2019)”, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (2021) 489–494.
Discussion Note “On Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism”, in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (2021) 495–502.
Abstract
This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
In Knowing and Seeing, Michael Ayers provides the groundwork for a new empiricism (as stated in the book’s subtitle). It is a critical contribution to epistemology. Let me present some of the book’s key statements upfront: (i) We perceive things in the world as they are, as part of our own environment. (ii) We are objects among other objects in the world; our relation to them may provide us with knowledge about them. (iii) (Primary) knowledge comes with knowledge of how and that we know. (This thesis, known as the ‘KK principle’, is at the core of Ayers’ conception of knowledge.) (iv) We can trust our senses. (v) Consequently, scepticism fails to provide a meaningful contribution to a better understanding of knowledge.
Knowing and Seeing is divided into two parts: the longer Part I on Knowledge, Belief, and Perception starts from the traditional view on knowledge and the distinction between knowledge and belief. Chapter 1 on ‘Knowledge and Belief from Plato to Locke’, co-authored with Maria Rosa Antognazza, offers a condensed, but clear outline of traditional epistemology with further thoughts on what we can learn from it. From there, Part I takes a turn to analytic phenomenology of perception and presents us with a notion of a basic (‘primary’) knowledge, which stems from the direct apprehension of reality. Starting from this fundamental thought, Ayers goes on to discuss conceptualism, in confrontation with McDowell, and ‘ordinary language’, examining examples of how we normally speak and think about knowledge, belief, understanding and the like. Part II deals with scepticism and externalism. It is a revelatory and important part. Ayers prepares us for Part IIin Part I, and he would not want us to skip it, as some might be tempted to do.
Keywords: primary knowledge, secondary knowledge, perception, scepticism
Abstract
Our private perception of listening to an individualized playlist during a jog is very different from the interaction we might experience at a live concert. We do realize that music is not necessarily a performing art, such as dancing or theater, while our demands regarding musical performances are conflicting: We expect perfect sound quality and the thrill of the immediate. We want the artist to overwhelm us with her virtuosity and we want her to struggle, just like a human. We want to engage with the musical expression and rely on visual and physical cues. Considering that the ears of today’s listeners are used to technologically mediated music, in this paper I explore the unique qualities of musical live performances and examine if our conception allows for new mechatronic inventions, in particular robotic musicians, to participate in this art form. Some of Godlovitch’s main thoughts expounded in his work on “musical performance” serve as a reference and starting point for this investigation. His concept of ‘personalism’, which deprives computer-/program-based musical performances from expressive potential and creative accomplishment is an issue that I want to challenge by pointing out new approaches arising from a reflective discourse on technology, embodiment and expression. The enquiry conducted illustrates, how in reasoning about machine performers and algorithmic realization of music, we also examine the perceptual, physical and social aspects of human musicianship, reconceptualizing our understanding of a musical live performance.
Keywords: embodiment, expression, music, performance, robotic musicianship, technology